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Ferret-Transmissible Inﬂuenza A(H5N1) Virus: Let Us Err on the Side
of Caution
T
he recent experiments with highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
A(H5N1) virus conducted in the laboratories of Fouchier and
Kawaoka have set off a debate about whether it is appropriate to
publish all of the details of these experiments publicly and about
how the viruses generated in these labs should now be handled. A
wide range of opinions has been expressed, both for and against
restrictions on publishing this work and on working with these
viruses. I would like to discuss some ideas put forth as arguments
against such restrictions.
First,ithasbeensuggestedthatH5N1isprobablynotapartic-
ularly dangerous virus and that the ofﬁcial WHO case fatality rate
(CFR) of approximately 60% is almost certainly a vast overesti-
mate (1–3) (“likely orders of magnitude too high” [1, 3]). This
claim is based on the ﬁndings of several human seroprevalence
studies conducted in several East and Southeast Asian countries
since the emergence of H5N1 as a zoonotic pathogen, reporting
up to 9.1% prevalence of H5N1 antibodies (1, 2). The rationale
would be that if up to 9% of the population in enzootic regions—
many millions of people—has been infected with H5N1 and sur-
vived, whereas there have been only a few hundred fatal cases, as
talliedbytheWHO,thenthetrueCFRcouldbevanishinglysmall.
However, there are methodological concerns about some H5N1
seroprevalence studies; it has elsewhere been estimated from se-
roprevalence studies that meet WHO H5N1 serology criteria that
fewer than 0.5% of the study subjects (26 out of 5,333 partici-
pants) are positive for H5N1 antibodies (4). More seroprevalence
studiesareclearlyneeded.Butifthetrueseroprevalenceisapprox-
imately 0.5%, on average, in enzootic regions, then WHO CFR
estimates would be a substantially incorrect measure of the actual
lethality of this virus. To complicate matters, however, one must
also consider the ﬂip side of this problem with ofﬁcial WHO esti-
mates,whichisthatinareasrifewithinfectiousdiseasemorbidity
and mortality, and with deaths due to pneumonia and acute re-
spiratory distress syndrome in particular, a signiﬁcant number of
fatal H5N1 infections are probably never identiﬁed as such. It is
thus currently extremely difﬁcult to arrive at an accurate CFR,
whereacaseisdeﬁnedasanyinfectionwiththeH5N1virus.What
is clear, however, is that this virus is amply capable of causing
severe disease and death. Even if ofﬁcial WHO estimates were 2
orders of magnitude too high, which is quite possible, an H5N1
pandemic would be worse than the 1918–1919 pandemic, which
had a CFR of 2.5% (5). But since we do not know the true
lethality of the H5N1 virus and since it is capable of rapid evolu-
tion, it would be beneﬁcial to err on the side of caution.
An additional problem with the idea that H5N1 should not be
consideredahighlylethalvirusinhumansisthatthisideaemerges
from cumulative data from a large number of studies of different
populations in multiple countries. In reality, different H5N1
strains of different evolutionary lineages have been circulating in
different areas at different times, and different human CFRs have
been observed across different geographical regions as well (6).
While multiple factors, including the timing and quality of med-
ical interventions, most likely contribute to variability in these
CFRs,itisalsoconceivablethatdifferentstrainsinherentlyvaryin
lethality. Indonesia, in particular, has seen the highest ofﬁcial
CFRs, and the only two Indonesian seroprevalence studies pub-
lished to date have found no one seropositive for H5N1, out of a
combinedtotalof1,336studyparticipants(7,8).Itispossiblethat
the true Indonesian CFR is 80 to 90%. Thus, it may be more
meaningful to consider CFRs speciﬁc to individual geographic
regions or evolutionary lineages.
Second, it has been claimed that the fact that the Fouchier lab
and Kawaoka lab viruses are transmitted well between ferrets is of
little or no predictive value for assessing the likelihood of their
efﬁcient transmission between humans (1–3). The ferret is gener-
ally regarded as a good, but not perfect, model for studying inﬂu-
enzavirustransmissibility(9,10).Ferret-transmissiblevirusesare
not necessarily transmitted well between humans (9, 10), and
thus,itistruethatwecannotknowwhethertheseviruseswouldbe
transmissible between humans. However, in addition to discuss-
ing the likelihood of efﬁcient transmissibility as an all-or-none
quality,itwouldalsobeusefultoaskhowclosethenewvirusesare
likelytobetobeingtransmissiblebetweenhumans,intermsofthe
numberofadditionalgeneticchangesthatwouldberequired.The
Fouchier and Kawaoka studies suggest that only a few mutations
arelikelytoberequiredforH5N1toadapttohumansbutalsothat
efﬁcient transmission would not occur until all of the required
mutations are accumulated. While ferrets are not humans, an
avian virus that has recently been made ferret transmissible is
probably quite close to being transmissible among humans, in
terms of the numbers of additional mutations required, if it does
notalreadyhavealloftherequiredmutations.Acomparisonwith
the emergence of oseltamivir resistance in pre-2009 pandemic,
seasonalH1N1isinstructive;inthatcase,itseemslikelythatonce
a permissive genetic background evolved, only one additional
mutation generated within one or more human hosts, indepen-
dently, was required to unleash ﬁt, oseltamivir-resistant strains
that then spread rapidly, at least within one region of the globe
(11). It also appears that avian inﬂuenza virus strains can infect a
wide range of mammalian species naturally and that H5N1 has
infectedanespeciallybroadrangeofhosts,evenamongbirds(12,
13). The Fouchier lab and Kawaoka lab viruses are not highly
ferret-adaptedstrainsthathavebeenpassagedaverylargenumber
of times through ferrets alone; the Fouchier lab viruses were pas-
saged 10 times through ferrets, and the Kawaoka lab viruses may
evenhavebeenpassagedasmallernumberoftimes(14,15).These
strainsaremostlikelypoisedtospreadthroughavarietyofmam-
mals, including humans, with a minimal number of additional
changes required.
Thus, at a minimum, it seems prudent to handle the Fouchier
Published 6 March 2012
Citation Murillo LN. 2012. Ferret-transmissible inﬂuenza A(H5N1) virus: let us err on the
side of caution. mBio 3(2):e00037-12. doi:10.1128/mBio.00037-12.
Copyright © 2012 Murillo. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License,
which permits unrestricted noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Address correspondence to Lisa N. Murillo, lmurillo@lanl.gov.
LETTER TO THE EDITOR
March/April 2012 Volume 3 Issue 2 e00037-12
® mbio.asm.org 1lab viruses at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4). Because the Kawaoka lab
viruses contain only the hemagglutinin gene of avian H5N1 and
did not cause any deaths among the ferrets studied (15), perhaps
the Kawaoka lab viruses need not be handled at BSL-4. But since
lab accidents happen with regularity, even at BSL-4 (16, 17), and
since the consequences of escape of the Fouchier lab’s ferret-
transmissible H5N1 viruses could potentially be so catastrophic,
letuschoosethepathofcautionwiththeFouchierlabviruses.The
consequences of underestimating these viruses’ pathogenicity or
propensity for transmission among humans are simply too great.
Redacting the details of the experimental methods and results
of the Fouchier and Kawaoka studies would also be an important
step in the right direction. We cannot assume that potential biot-
erroristsorhobbyistswouldhavespeciﬁc,logicalgoalsorthatthey
would be competent in achieving those goals. We cannot assume
thattheywouldhaveacommandofallpriorliteratureor,indeed,
that they could put together methods for a project from multiple
sources. Let us erect as many barriers as possible between the
results of these studies and anyone who may try to produce a
highly pathogenic H5N1 virus that is transmitted well between
humans,inthehopethatoneofthesebarrierswouldbesufﬁcient.
Fundamentally, the way biological research is done needs to
change; new threats are emerging where there were fewer before.
As others have noted, biological research is now facing situations
similar to that faced by physics research in the 1940s (18, 19). At
many institutions, it is an understood and accepted reality that
there are things one cannot talk about in public. It is also under-
stood that the decisions about what one can talk about in public
are not up to the individual scientist but rather are decided by
security experts and policies that attempt to balance academic
freedom and national security concerns. It is time for such con-
trolstobeconsideredmorebroadlyforbiologicalresearch,sothat
wemaymorereadilyavoidsituationssuchasthepresentone.And
if increased security hampers scientiﬁc research and progress in
inﬂuenza virus or other pathogen research, so be it. Signiﬁcantly
worse things could happen.
It will be very useful to have a uniform set of guidelines to
govern future work in dual-use areas of biological research. It
would be most beneﬁcial for such guidelines to emerge from in-
ternationaldiscussionandagreement.Ourinternationalcommu-
nityneedstodecidewhichkindsofexperimentswewishtoallow,
what safety and security protocols should be followed when con-
ducting such experiments, and what may be published and dis-
cussed publicly. These are large decisions with potentially large
consequencesfortheworldasawhole,andtheyshouldnotbeleft
to individuals to decide. Let us hope that with such guidelines in
place, we will not soon be engaging in more after-the-fact discus-
sions akin to those we are having today.
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